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1. The dynamics of group interests and societal conflicts as a reason of state
socialism collapse and its transformation
There is a growing consensus among social and political scientists that, in order to
better understand the ongoing processes of market and democracy oriented
transformations in post-socialist societies, we have to pay more attention to the ways
people were contributing to the "unexpected collapse" of the ancient regime. If we
approach the problem from this perspective then it may appear that a lot of
diagnoses and interpretations, offered by the mushrooming ranks of collapsologists,
would present themselves as being either inadequate or oversimplified, and as such
they deserve to be seriously re-evaluated or even rejected as a kind of common-
sense knowledge. What I have here in mind refers primarily to those methodological
concepts which attempt to explain the "spectacular demise of communism", relying
predominantly on the exogenous factors of system destruction, and ignoring or
underestimating those indigenous ones, and among them in particular their structural
and cultural specificity as a decisive force in a given case of state-socialist society
crisis and its transformation. To these types of one - factor - analyses one could
ascribe not only the contributions of those authors who tend to reduce the system
collapse phenomenon either to the charisma of great leaders, be them Gorbachev,
Walesa or even the Polish Pope, or to the conscious move of the "regional
hegemony" who "purposely triggered regime crises in Eastern Europe" (Di Palma,
1993). Another instance of such an easily achieved explanations, is offered by the
prominent political scientists, who approach all of East European, including the
former USSR, cases of regime change - "regardless of their geopolitical location or
cultural context" - as a part of the same "wave of democratization that began in 1974
in Portugal". They also assume that all of this cases should be regarded" as parts of
common process of diffusion and causal interaction" (Schmitter and Karl, 1992).
What is characteristic to these methods of perceiving the processes of East European
systems change is their openly declared disbelief in the role of spontaneous social
actions in those processes. As emphasized by Di Palma," it was not popular action
that by some overlooked quality, caused communist collapse. It was the already deep
crisis of the regimes - their loss of confidence, their manifest abdication - that
opened the gates to popular actions". Following O'Donnell and Schmitter, this
author also believes that, during the regime crisis and transformation period,
"scholarly reliance on enduring group interests, structures, and values to predict
behavior - is no longer useful".
Of course, such a research methodology could be justified on the ground of the
speculative version of totalitarian and post totalitarian system approach, or in the
case of ideologically - minded theories of communism or "post communism".
However, they lose their cognitive potential when confronted with the wealth of
empirical reality offered by historically and culturally specific traits of what is
supposed to be defined as communist legacy of a given society. In order to avoid
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such terminological biases, one has to either resign from such ambiguous terms as
"communism" or "totalitarianism", or to follow those scholars who consequently
stick to more pragmatic terms. One of most convenient might be the term "state
socialism", perceived as "variations in the social structure of a society that may
generate a body of political demands and political interests" (Lane, 1990). In favor
of this kind of pragmatic definition are the opinions of scholars who persuasively
prove that totalitarian model may be accepted only as a "typological category",
fitting quite closely to the Soviet Union under Stalin rule, but later on, even in this
country, "gradually losing its explanatory power" (Walicki, 1993).
My own methodological credo prompts me to believe that neither the totalitarian or
quasi-totalitarian system of power as such, nor even the depth of its communist or
socialist ideology implementation, but rather its inner contradictions, stemming from
the historical uniqueness of the "designed" by this system social structures, deserve
to be taken as decisive factor responsible for the system collapse and the trajectories
of the on-going processes of the "post-societies" transformation. What is primarily
unique to these state-socialists variations in the planned or designed models of their
social structures should be linked with their innate propensity to generate group
interests and value orientations conducive to the emergence of such a type of
societal and political conflict, that has been able to challenge and destroy the system
itself.
As we have realized ex post, the possibility of having such a conflict of interest in
state socialism, and specifically of defining its principal actors, was hardly
predictable. In Poland, since August 1980 we were given the privilege to be among
the first observers or participants of such a societal conflict eruption. We were also
in position to analyze and interprete systematically the mechanisms of its
structuration and the stages of its further evolution. In our first attempts aimed at
understanding and interpreting this conflict we were using the concepts of agency, as
well as the theories of "new" social movements as a source of conceptual inspiration
"(Giddens, 1984, Touraine, 1979, Tilly, 1986). Instrumental proved to be also the
structurally minded theories of social conflicts and group interests (Dahrendorf,
1959, Parkin, 1976, Mills, 1951, 1967). However, it appeared soon that none of
these methodological approaches was adequately tailored in order not only to
envisage, but also to convincingly explain the type of agency and accompanying it
societal movement of vindicative nature, or conflict of interest, we have been facing
in Poland.
What sounded plausible in Touraine was his idea of "new social movements" as a
kind of agency which "has no reason to be subordinated to any political, intellectual
or moral forces - external to it". Less attractive was this author's assumption that
"new social movements" are supposed to rely on "middle class employees and
professionals rather then on the new working class". At first glance more applicable
to us, but also misleading - although quite often referred to with any deeper
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understanding - seemed to be Dahrendorfian concept of "industrial conflict". Its
principal weakness, as evaluated from our perspective, stems from the fact that it
deals with conflicts of interests organized from above rather than spontaneously
articulated, and, in any case, does not envisage the option for such a conflict
contribution to social change of systemic nature.
Highly instrumental in grasping the essence of Polish conflict appered to be Charles
Wright Mills' thoughts on the conditions under which industrial workers tend to
become "a class - for themselves and a decisive political force". This author's
analyses of American society brought him to the conclusion that both Marxian and
liberal assumptions "that men, given the opportunity", will be rationalistic enough
"to come to political consciousness of their interests" and "engage in class action",
didn't found, however, any empirical proof (Mills, 1951). In spite of this failure,
Mills was, till his last days, strongly involved in desperate search for "an historical
agency and social and institutional actors of structural change". In quite apparent
way inspired by student dissents and the sudden eruption of new social movements
of the sixties, he was prone to see this "historical agency" in "the intelligentsia in its
broadest sense" As far as workers are concerned, Mills left us with the following
words, which - twenty years later, and in a quite remote historical context - sounded
as a sheer prophecy. Referring to his comparative studies on working classes, which
"were not completed yet", Mills expressed the opinion that "only at a certain (earlier)
stages of industrialization, and in political context of autocracy do wage workers
tend to become a class for themselves" (Mills, 1967)
If we agree that his prediction found its fulfillment first of all in the Polish context of
state socialist society, then we have to notice that it happened contrary not only to
the mainstream of well established theories of interests and agency; f. ex. Mancur
Olson (1965) claimed as "logical irrationality" to expect "the emergence of any class
interests consciousness and action". It happened also as something in what Mills
himself was not prone to believe.
What was really hardly predictable on the basis of Western, and especially
American, patterns of structural development, was the creation under state socialism
of such a structural component which was primarily responsible for the emergence
of specific to this system type of agency and group interests rationality. What we do
know from the analyses on the dynamics of Polish conflict (Adamski et al. 1993,
Rychard, 1993), says that such an agency on the group or social class level appeared
primarily among the new brand of industrial workers and intelligentsia, being the
main "products" and actors of the socialist industrialization.
The phenomena of the widespread diffusion of interests consciousness among basic
social classes was more or less present in all East European state socialist societies.
However, only in Poland it found the most fertile conditions for such interests open
and spectacular manifestation. It holds true not only when we look at contentious or
POLAND IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
PAGE 10
rebellious type of social consciousness, but also at destructive to the system,
organized forms of collective behavior. Both of these features of contentious agency
have developed as the outcome of what, in this country socialist reality, was not only
universal, but also what should be perceived as the result of its structural and
cultural peculiarities. Crucial characteristic of this type of contentious agency was
that people located in dependent social positions quite frequently gain an awareness
of the fact that their interests are different from the interests of those located in
power positions (Adamski, et.al. 1982; Adamski, 1985; Rychard, 1987). Although
this statement might resemble the Dahrendorfian approach, it goes beyond this
author's preoccupation with the fight for position of authority between "dominant"
and "subjected" actors motivated by the "latent" or "manifest" interests within a
given "coordinated association". What did not fit to our political context was the fact
that under the Polish version of state socialism the emergence of agency and basic
group interests consciousness was not aimed at the "interests of other dependent
groups, competing among themselves for better access to the limited amount of
distributive goods, but primarily at the very foundations of the system itself, as well
as the legitimacy of its political power elities.
Among the explanatory hypotheses, I am going to verify in this paper, the crucial
one refers to both the system and culture bound peculiarities of the "designed" by
state socialism social structure. It says that under the Polish version of state
socialism, these structural peculiarities, and especially the emergence of common
interests between the "new working class" and "proletarianized intelligentsia",
proved to be destructive to the socialist system in general, and specifically to the
ways of its ideology implementation. It is hypothesized further that in the current
stage of systemic transformation this structural legacy has been still active in
challenging the neoliberal ideology as well as the strategies of its implementation
applied by the new political elities.
2. Structural-generational premises of the emergence of system challenging
interests
It is assumed that the appearance of contentious agency, which is in position to
generate a societal type of social and political conflict, has been deeply rooted not
only in what may be defined as universal patterns of state socialist social structure
sensu largo, but also in its specific for a given country demographic determinants. In
the case of Poland the coincidence of these structural/demographic peculiarities has
substantially contributed to the distortions in the processes of cultural transmission
between generations, as well as to the emergence of a new generation, recruited
from those of Poles who belonged to the first post-World War II "baby boom". Such
an assumption is based on the sociological conception of "ascendant generation"
which is concerned with looking for historically specific age cohorts as potential
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actors of a given society cultural and structural change. Some vital encouragement in
developing this conception we may receive from cultural anthropology, as well as
from family and life course sociology (Mead, 1970; Elder, 1979). These disciplines
seem especially convincing in linking some historically specific age cohorts of
"newcomers" with a global society undergoing an accelerated process of radical
technological and social transformations (Keniston, 1965; Mannheim, 1944).
Another source of inspiration came from the structurally minded research on
socialization processes in post-industrial societies. What they disclose says that the
level of social aspirations and ambitions of individuals tends to be "relatively
independent" of the family influences (Spenner and Featherman, 1976), and also that
these new aspirations are prone to behave as more and more "autonomous social
force" (Chombart de Lauwe, 1975). What is important in the findings offered by
these considerations is that they perceive the family socializing functions, and
consequently its power of shaping new aspirations, as being strongly dependent on
specific for a given "ascending generation" a historical context of its socialization
and life opportunities.
The crucial question to be posed here is under what structural circumstances the new
types of social aspirations, represented by a given cohorts of ascendant generation,
might have a chance to reach such a level of autonomy that would allow this
generation to articulate its aspirations and basic needs in terms of group interests
conducive to such a conflict which is empowered to threaten the very foundations of
social and political system? In looking for an answer to this question, except of such
macro-determinants as the pace of modernization processes and their coincidence
with the situation of economic crises or a sudden growth of the size of ascendant
generation in a society, we pay a special attention to the distinctive features of a state
socialist political system and the type of social structure responsible for conflicting
socialization of the ascendant generations.
The latter statement encourages me to advance the hypothesis that the state socialist
societies of East-Central Europe, and among them Poland in particular, under the
circumstances of the clash of their indigenous cultures with imposed upon them
social structures and ideologies, were creating exceptionally favorable conditions for
their "ascendant generations" to become basically disassociated from the pressures
exerted on them not only by the family milieu, but also by the inconsistency of state
socialist ideological indoctrination (taking place on both the educational institutions
and the work environment) as the most decisive socializing agency for school
leavers (Adamski, 1980).
From this point of view we may distinguish at least three sets of structural
determinants, shaping the generational peculiarities of the post World War II East
Europeans, and mostly the Polish "baby boom" generation. What in particular
deserve our closer insight is: (1) The absolute, and especially the relative size of
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"newcomer cohorts" in demographic structure of a society; (2) their participation in
the socialist pattern of "educational expansion" and, (3) the heightened level of their
life aspirations as confronted with career opportunities offered to them by state
socialism.
As proved by the demographic statistics (see table 1), since the late fifties the size of
age cohorts belonging to the young generation has become much more prominent
and their importance has been felt much more seriously in the eastern then in the
western part of Europe. However, what really matters when the life chances for the
ascendant generation are considered, is not only the absolute growth of the young
age cohorts, but above all the ratio between the ascendant cohorts (15-29 years of
age) and the established cohorts (30-59 years), as well as the variations in this ratio
as it changes from one decade to another.
From this perspective the following tendencies deserve our attention: (1) the impact
of the post World War II "rejuvenation" of European societies, as observed through
the ratio of ascendant generations to stabilized or older generations in 1970, was the
highest in Poland (among Eastern countries) and Holland (in Western); (2) at the
same time the change in this ratio between 1970 and 1980 achieved the highest
level, on the one side in France, and on the other - in Poland; (3) however, when we
try to correlate both factors, i.e. the rates of absolute growth of young generations
and the variations in their proportion to the older ones over time, then Poland
appears as the only country which since 1970 exhibits the strongest, cumulative and
long-lasting effect of the process of demographic rejunvention.
It goes without saying that any sudden increase or fluctuation in the size of youth
cohorts must exert a heavy pressure on older generations of a given society, as well
as on chances for smooth or disruptive course of this society development. It is also
quite obvious that this pressure should first of all effect the educational system. For
the "baby boomers' of Eastern Europe it meant, above all, an increase of
opportunities for secondary - general and/or vocational education to the point where
it became universally accessible. Not equally impressive, but nevertheless notable
progress has been made in opening the institutions of higher education, with a
special preferences given to children from peasant and worker families.
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Table 1. Age Cohorts of 15-29 as Related to 30-59 Years, as Compared to East and
Selected West European Countries in the Post-World War II Decades*
Country
Years
  Age cohorts (in thousands)
Ratio
A/B
Change in ratio
over preceding
decads (%)
 15-29
  (A:)
30-59
 (B:)
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
France
The Netherlands
Sweden
1960
1970
1981
1990
1958
1968
1979
1990
1960
1970
1980
1991
1960
1970
1980
1991
1956
1969
1981
1990
1960
1970
1980
1990
1960
1970
1980
1991
1960
1970
1980
1990
1.834
1.922
1.905
1.873
3.829
2.796
3.470
3.421
2.154
2.437
2.356
1.816
6.442
8.299
9.475
12.790
4.684
4.512
4.825
5.216
8.859
11.336
12.733
12.790
2.490
3.311
3.554
2.893
1.993
1.828
1.703
1.779
3.046
3.355
2.937
3.557
6.460
5.270
4.963
5.264
3.904
3.948
4.183
4.184
10.510
11.439
12.972
15.092
5.483
7.671
8.466
8.338
17.101
17.606
19.788
21.766
3.851
4.372
5.048
3.691
3.050
2.964
3.143
3.002
0,60
0,57
0,64
0,53
0,59
0,53
0,70
0,65
0,55
0,62
0,56
0,43
0,61
0,72
0,73
0,85
0,85
0,59
0,57
0,62
0,52
0,64
0,64
0,59
0,69
0,73
0,70
0,78
0,65
0,62
0,54
0,52
- 7,7
+ 13,0
-18,8
-10,5
+31,9
-7,1
+11,8
-8,8
-23,2
+18,5
+0,6
+16,0
-31,2
-3,3
+9,8
+24,1
0,0
-8,8
+5,6
-4,0
+11,1
-5,7
-12,1
+9,4
* Source: UN Demographic Yearbooks
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The empirical data at hand allow us to conclude that the educational opportunities
opened by state socialism before the first postwar generations of Eastern Europeans
have dramatically surpassed the level of the education reached by their fathers' and
mothers' generations. This applies to all countries compared, except of
Czechoslovakia, where significant differences between the ascendant and stabilized
age cohorts appeared only on the lowest level of education. Both in Hungary and
Poland this educational advancement of "baby boomers" is significant on both
elementary and basic vocational levels, but in Poland only - it applies also to the
level of tertiary education. Such an impressive generation gap is a historically rather
unique phenomenon. And its implications for social and political system functioning
deserve a more careful analysis.
One would expect that being objectively in such a privileged position, as far as the
educational chances are concerned, the ascendant generations of the post World War
"baby boom" in Eastern Europe would display nothing but sheer enthusiasm about
what they were able to achieve. The relevant empirical evidence does not confirm
such an expectation. In all the countries being compared the first baby-boom
generations disclosed a remarkable gap between the level of schooling they attained
and their aspirations to enhance it further. This concerns higher education above all.
The desire to acquire university or equivalent credentials seemed in 1978 to be
strong enough in any East European society, but it might come as a surprise that, on
the one hand, these aspirations were relatively weaker in Czechoslovakia, and that
on the other hand, they were unusually strong in Poland (see: table 2). Comparing
the most striking aspects of educational goals in both their real and desired
dimensions, we may conclude that, unlike the Czechs and Slovaks, as well as the
Hungarians, whose aspirations were more or less evenly distributed, the young
Polish employees belonging to the baby boom generation, with their extremely
strong commitment to further education, showed a separate pattern.
Among the factors that deserve to be identified as the sources of relatively higher
aspirations and also of keener disappointments, revealed in violent way in the year
of 1980, by Polish industrial employees, probably the crucial one was related with
the drastically limited career opportunities available to those of them who belonged
to the generation of babyboomers. This applies in particular, on the one hand to
those who were forced to choose the basic vocational tracks of postcompulsory
education, and on the other - to those who graduated from the university level
educational institutions. Poland is the best example for the statement that in the
countries of Eastern Europe social structure became increasingly closed once the
first phase of the socialist industrialization was completed. Indeed, a tendency is
shown that social mobility have substantially decreased both in intra - and
intergenerational dimensions, as is particularly clearly demonstrated in the years of
1970s and early 1980s (Bia_ecki, 1986).
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Table 2. Young Employees' Educational Attainments and Aspirations: Poland as
Compared to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1978 (in %)
Country
Education achieved (A) and desired (B)
Less than
secondary
Secondary Higher
Czechoslovakia
 A*
 B*
Ratio B/A
70.5
46.3
  0.7
24.6
38.1
  1.5
4.9
15.6
  3.2
Hungary
 A*
 B*
           Ratio B/A
57.4
30.8
  0.5
33.5
38.6
  1.2
9.0
30.6
  3.3
Poland
 A*
 B*
           Ratio B/A
64.8
35.3
  0.5
32.3
41.2
  1.3
3.0
24.5
  8.1
* A = achieved education
** B = level of education desired, as measured by level of educational aspirations.
(Source: F. Gazso and V. Shubkin, 1980)
How seriously affected by these structural barriers were those educated young
people from the baby boom generation, we can ascertain when looking at the results
of comparative research (see: Gazso and Shubkin, 1980). The structure of work
placement in four East European countries show that, except of Czechoslovakia, it
was highly uncoupled with respect to the school qualifications. In contrast to their
Czech and Slovak counterparts, the Poles were on the average assigned to relatively
lower ranks and positions. It holds true, above all, for the graduates of secondary
vocational schools. While their Czech and Slovak colleagues of this same education
nearly always enjoyed the very prestigious status of "white-collar worker with
professional qualifications", the majority of the Poles had good reasons to consider
themselves downgraded or underemployed. The lot of graduates with basic
vocational education as potential carriers of rebellious attitudes and behavior should
draw our special attention. While in Czechoslovakia about 40 percent of these
graduates were placed in white collar positions, in Poland almost all of them were
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channeled into the ranks of blue-collar workers, thus creating an incomparably huge,
separate generational stratum within the working class.
How conflict-laden this situation was in Poland in the midseventies, and
specifically, how it influenced the generational relations in the workplace, one may
judge on the basis of the present author research on the "two generations of
industrial employees" (Adamski, 1980). When I measured the impact of education
in the workplace on the level of job satisfaction, reported by the young (17-30
years), as compared to older (45 years and more) industrial employees from the
same enterprises, the results we surprising. Defined by the level of work satisfaction,
the gap between the younger and the older cohorts appeared to be very wide,
especially on the higher rungs of the educational ladder. While the generational
belongings played almost no role among employees with only primary school
education, as far as job satisfaction is concerned, the different amount of education
sets apart sharply those with basic vocational, secondary vocational and higher
technical education.
As these data clearly prove, the general indices of job satisfaction in our sample drop
drastically with increasing levels of employees' education. This negative correlation
between the quantity and quality of schooling received and self-reported job
satisfaction runs exactly counter to the results shown by the research done in
Western societies (_uda, 1981). What is worth to emphasize in here is that Polish
blue-collar workers, specially those young and skilled, on the average reported
almost twice as high a level of occupational satisfaction as engineers and other
college-trained professional employed at the same enterprises. The low level of job
satisfaction experienced by young employees was understandable. Having been
given, in many cases, as much as twice the amount of education when compared to
older employees, they were at the same time both dramatically underpaid and denied
the opportunity to utilize their educational qualifications as well as to have an access
to the posts of authority. The young professionals with secondary school and
university credentials appeared to be extremely disadvantaged financially. While
doing the same work and occupying the same socio-economic positions, they were
paid much less than their equals in the same field who belonged to the older
generation. Their discontent was also due to the seniority and political correctness
rule, keeping them aside from more challenging and especially managerial positions.
On the basis of these analyses I feel entitled to conclude that the perceptions of
relative deprivation which produced in Poland, primarily in the young industrial
employees, contentious attitudes and behavior was especially strong among the
skilled workers and the university trained specialists. They felt cheated because the
road to the satisfaction of their ambitious economic, vocational, and socio-political
needs and aspirations had been mostly blocked to them. It was found, above all, in
those socio-vocational groups which of necessity and not of their own choice,
remained economically and socially dependent - both from their families and the
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state. Such a double dependency lasted beyond the reasonable period of time. This
situation has contributed to the emergence of specifically socialist phenomenon,
which I once called as the "stage of extended social youth". It was extremely
frustrating to those young adults who either approached or even exceeded the age
bracket of 30 years. Contrary to many influential theories of conflict - breeding
socialization, the attitudes of deprivation and rebelliousness revealed by the Polish
"baby boomers", and among them mostly the specialists, have not manifested itself
in the family and in the relations with their parents, and even not in the secondary or
higher education institutions, as was the case with western dissenters. Contrary to
this situation, the Polish "baby boomers" had chosen the state socialist nomenclatura
class as their "enemies", and socialist workplaces as the battle-ground in their fight
for both generational interests and identity.
3. The actors of political conflict and their structural location: continuity and
change in the years 1981-1988.
It is widely accepted that behind the Polish conflict embodied in the spontaneously
emerged Solidarity movement there were not only economic demands, to be
measured in distributive dimension of interest articulation, but also the claims of
strictly political and systemic nature, addressed to the central power. This way of
perceiving the conflict structure tends to recall the dichotomy pattern, which divides
its actors into antagonistic parts, i.e. "us" (society) and "them" (people in power).
However, this methodological approach appeared to be in many respects
oversimplified. We can prove it when looking closer at the manifest and latent
interests represented, on the one hand by the actors involved in creation and
supporting of Solidarity and, on the other, by those who more or less supported the
Party and the system, and who decided to keep their privileged positions due to the
affiliation with the so-called Branch trade unions. Of course, such a clear-cut
political and ideological dichotomy within basic social groups of state employees
did not exclude their tacit cooperation, or even their participation in common protest
actions. It usually happened when the economic interests of both unions were
equally endangered by the government policy.
In spite of this fact that all employees of the state socialist economy, and among
them also the majority of higher managers, shared some of common interests and
solidarity in relation to those who monopolized the central power, in the situation of
sharp economic and political crisis they tended to realize that their vital interests are
opposing each other, and when it appeared that trade union affiliation is the most
adequate structure for these conflicting interests articulation.
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Table 3. Trade union affiliation by socio-occupational categories in 1981
Socio-occupational
categories
N=100 Solidarity Branch
union
Other
unions
Non-
unionized
Skilled workers in heavy
industry
Skilled workers in light
industry
Lower level supervisors
and foremen
Technicians
Other
skilled and semi-skilled
Professionals*
Middle-level
administrative staff
Intermediate
Office employees,
blue/white collar
Unskilled and laborers
Workers/part-time
farmers
Office employees
Higher managers
Teachers
Craftsmen
Farmers
Retired (except from
agriculture)
Retired from agriculture
Not gainfully employed
Housewives
 60
108
 49
 45
100
 22
 42
106
 53
101
 90
 89
 58
 40
 42
331
329
 36
 57
131
86,7
74,1
73,5
71,1
69,0
 68,2
 66,7
 62,3
 62,3
 55,4
 53,3
 51,7
 51,7
 47,5
 14,3
 12,7
 12,5
 11,1
7,0
  6,1
3,3
10,2
14,2
15,5
15,0
 4,5
16,7
18,9
18,9
14,9
11,1
22,4
31,0
2,5
4,8
1,5
12,7
2,8
12,3
   -
 6,0
 1,9
 2,0
-
 1,0
 4,5
 7,1
 7,5
 7,5
 5,9
 3,3
 6,7
 1,7
45,0
-
 0,3
 7,9
-
 7,0
 0,8
10,0
13,9
10,2
13,3
15,0
22,7
 9,5
11,3
11,3
23,8
32,2
19,1
15,5
 5,0
81,0
85,5
66,9
86,1
73,7
93,1
* - excluding engineers and economists
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The most spectacular expression of such a conflict manifestation occurred by the
end of 1981, i.e. just before the imposition of martial law. When evaluated by the
Solidarity as opposed to the Branch union membership, this conflict revealed a
striking asymmetry between its sides (see: table 3). I was clear at first glance that
Solidarity had an overwhelming majority mostly among manual workers, and first of
all, among those who received their skills in vocational schools and who were
relatively younger. On the average 73 per cent of employees below the age of 30
years were then Solidarity members, and they also belonged to the most militant
participants in protest actions, while among employees in the older age brackets
both union membership and protest activity were much lower (below 50 per cent)
and more evenly distributed. Except of teachers and higher managers, those among
the state employees, who after the August 1980, had chosen to stay in branch unions
and not to join Solidarity, constituted no more than 10 to 20 per cent of each of the
most influential social groups.
In order to properly interpret these unprecedented indices of spontaneously emerging
participation in organized and contentious activity of trade-unions under state
socialist system, one has to confront them with the distribution of Party membership
in both Solidarity and Branch unions. We have done it with respect to two separate
stages of this conflict evolution, i.e. before and after the imposition of martial law
(see: table 4).
Table 4. Party membership and trade union affiliation by socio-occupational
categories in 1981, 1984 and 1988 (in %)
Category Party
member
                  1981   1984   1988
Solidarity Branch
union
Branch union Branch union
Managers and
specialists
yes
no
   55
   70
  28
  15
  48
  18
  71
  26
Technicians yes
no
   65
   72
  27
  15
  41
  23
  57
  28
Office
employees
yes
no
   33
   61
  54
  16
  43
  25
  83
  30
Skilled workers yes
no
   76
   72
  20
    8
  50
  17
  72
  29
Farmers and
part-time
farmers
yes
no
   16
   20
  32
    2
  42
   8
  48
  23
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These comparisons allow us to disclose the following traits of this conflict structure:
(1) In spite of the fact that Solidarity gained a dominant position in basic social
categories, in the pro-government unions remained a considerable proportion of
employees who either occupied positions of authority (as managers and
administrative staff) or those who were performing ideologically bound professions,
as was the case of teachers, being almost on equal parts split between Solidarity and
the old Teachers Union; (2) Not only employees from different social-occupational
groups, but also those declaring their Party membership appeared to be sharply
divided in between the opposing trade unions.
These kind of contradictive allocation of the principal actors of conflict in the social
and political structures should be accepted as a background for this conflict potential
to persistently mobilize contentious group interests against the central power, and
thus to decisively contribute to the aggravation of system efficacy crisis, The
unusual depth of such a structural crisis should be considered as a principle reason
of the system collapse. What allows us to define it as a rather unique type of
structural conflict, as approached through the prism of this conflict composition, is
primarily linked with the structurally based differentiation and even political
polarization of the strata of intelligentsia. As proved by empirical evidence at hand
this kind of conflicting divisions was most clearly identified not only among the
category of specialists with university level credentials, as was the case with
managers and teachers, but also among those with the secondary education diploma,
as was demonstrated by the categories of lower ranks of administrative staff who
preferred to protect their interests through the old union membership.
As far as political cleavages between both union in conflict are concerned, they
could be also observed through their preferences to protest actions. While those
managers and specialists who were affiliated with Solidarity union, tended to
express their overwhelming support to strikes, those from Branch unions were rather
reluctant to any approval of this form of social protest (see: table 5). Curiously
enough, this pattern of political - attitudes differentiation within the stratum of
intelligentsia was in power not only during the peak of Solidarity legal existence i.e.
in 1980-1981, but also after this movement was crushed by the harsh measures
applied against it on the ground of martial law. In 1988, when the Branch unions
were able to rebuilt their monopolistic position, as the pro-government organization,
the specialists who joined these union, in clear majority, were still expressiong their
disapproval to strikes, while these specialists and managers who stayed outside this
progovernment union, i.e. mostly former Solidarity members, were declaring the
opposite preference, thus replicating exactly the same pattern of protest propensity
as if they still were Solidarity members.
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Table 5. Approval of strikes by social position and trade union affiliation
in1981-1988 and 1990-1995 (in %)
Social categories
Year
Solidarity Branch unions
Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove
Managers and specialists 1981
1988
1990
1995
65
62*
17
60
   32
31*
79
   40
  17
30
29
  30
  77
60
71
  60
Semi-specialists and office
employees
1981
1988
1990
1995
72
  41*
46
51
28
  49*
48
36
42
36
30
32
58
52
65
67
Blue/white collar employees 1981
1988
1990
1995
58
  42*
21
78
39
  54*
78
11
31
20
30
32
69
53
65
63
Skilled workers 1981
1988
1990
1995
61
  43*
25
47
35
  47*
73
41
29
36
29
51
67
51
70
43
Unskilled workers 1981
1988
1990
1995
40
  30*
31
47
54
  59*
66
47
18
29
40
33
82
55
53
59
* Data for 1988 refer to the category of "non members of trade union", since the Solidarity union
was not legalized yet.
Behind these cleavages within the strata of intelligentsia, as measured both by their
trade union membership and attitudes toward strikes, one could quite easily identify,
on the one side the vindictive interests and value orientations of those who were
seeking either for improving of their position in access to posts of authority and
related with it privileges (what pushed them to support a typical for Solidarity
leaders pressure on the government, aimed at the "introduction of real reforms of the
system") and on the other side, the endangered interests of those who were
determined to defend their privileged position in power, or who simply were this
power supporters for pragmatic or ideological reasons.
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In trying to evaluate the above mentioned split in the socialist strata of Polish
intelligentsia, and primarily of those of its members who were state employees in
industries, we should also keep in mind the fact that, contrary to the situation in
other East European societies, and the Soviet Union in particular, quite a similar, if
not much serious process of political polarization was taking place among the
highest ranks of Polish intellectuals. To lesser extent it applied also to the central
nomenclature class, and even to the grass-root level of Party activists. The most
spectacular expression of these conflict breeding cleavages among the ideological
and political elites was the existence (until the introduction of martial law) of
fiercely opposing each other, separate associations within the Polish Writers Union,
as well as journalists association, and also the emergence of open factions and
"revisionist" tendencies within the Party itself.
If we take into account the depth of the Polish intelligentsia involvement in both
parts of conflict under consideration, then it would appear as a phenomenon having
no comparable precedence in other East European state socialist societies. When
looking for the possibility of interpreting this phenomenon, we can find it on the
ground of the system contradictions theory. If the strata of intelligentsia, and
intellectuals in particular, are to be treated under socialism as an elite (highly
politicized), then this elite differentiation in the way revealing the symptoms of
"system contradiction" may be approached, following Frank Parkin, as fundamental
prerequisite of the vital disturbance in both the "stratification order" and "power
equilibrium", what should be taken as conducive to the "social system
transformation" (Parkin, 1976).
Except of the split of intelligentsia, another Polish peculiarity, which may be also
approached as a conflict generating expression of "structural contradiction of state
socialism", should be linked with the emergence in this country of what I call the
"new working class". The specificity of this class found its expression in the fact that
it members were able not only to gain the "rational awareness" of/and identification
with "their class interests", but also were able to learn how to use the "collective
political means" in order to achieve the collective political ends" in realizing their
interests.
The existence of such a working class which is characterized by heightened
aspirations, attitudes of autonomy, self-confidence and a sense of independence in
its relations with the people of power, are the traits which could be hardly found in
western societies. As proven by Kohn and Slomczynski, (1987), it was not the case
of American workers as compared to their Polish counterparts. On the other side of
the system borderline, such a working class had not appeared also in the Soviet
Union, where the "state dependent type of worker" seemed to prevail (Zaslavsky,
1995). To the specific qualities of the Polish industrial workers, especially
pronounced among the first post World War II baby boom generation, one should
also add their cohesiveness and the strongest involvement in protest actions, as well
WLADYSLAW ADAMSKI
PAGE 23
as their equalized economic and social status - when compared with the non-manual
specialist at the work-place. All this has contributed to another structural peculiarity
of the Polish conflict background, which resulted in the phenomenon of working
class alliance with the proletarianized intelligentsia. The close cooperation of the
two partners, being openly supported by the dissident intellectuals, created the
strength of Solidarity as an independent institution voicing not only their own, but
also most the broader social and national interests and aspirations.
It belongs to common knowledge that the imposition of martial law, aimed at
accommodating the Polish conflict through the harsh legal administrative, and
openly coercive actions, basically failed to achieve its goal. The rudimentary
institutional forms of Solidarity existence were able to survive as an underground
organization. Much more was secured, however, in the field of social consciousness,
and this mostly applies to the spirit of resistance to the policy offered by those in
power, what could be interpreted as the "dormant" or "hidden" stage of the same
structural conflict evolution.
4. Societal conflict accommodation and its enduring legacies: "winners" and
"losers" or actors and clients in the process of systemic transformation
What is the fate of the Polish conflict after the political break-through of the system
in 1989? Has it totally or partially disappeared or simply changed its shape, just
falling apart into broader spectrum of highly differentiated group interests or
pressure groups? If we try to approach this question through the main trends of real
changes, that have occurred in the inherited social structure during the initial stages
of transformation processes, then the answer will be "rather yes". It means that the
conflict under consideration has basically lost its system destructive potential. The
most visible symptoms of this sort of social dynamics are to be related to the radical
shifts in the structural location of the main actors of systemic conflict, what has
primarily contributed to the dissolution of what we have called as the alliance
between the new working class and this part of socialist intelligentsia which felt
frustrated, because of their blocked aspirations, and specifically, because of being
deprived of access to power positions and privileges attached to these positions. As I
have been trying to prove earlier, this historically rather unique alliance was
basically aimed against the inefficiency of the state socialist system in general, but
not necessarily against its equalitarian ideology and distributive functions of the
state. Such ambivalent motivations were mostly shared by the more powerful partner
of the alliance i.e. the working class, while the intelligentsia was much strongly
involved in the fight against the monopoly of power, performed by the nomenclature
people.
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In the new systemic reality, introduced as a result of the "Round Table" agreements
and the first quasi-democratic parliamentary elections of 1989, the Polish conflict
has entered in a visible way at its phase of an aneasy accommodation. Among the
decisive factors responsible for such a breakthrough, one has to identify not only the
effect of political freedom explosion, and relased by it processes of untempered
group interests articulation and their representation through the imposition of
democratic procedures. Equally, or even more important seems to be, from this point
of view, the influence of liberal ideology, and in particular the abandoning of the
socialist dogma of full employment policy as well as the social consequences of
privatization processes, launched by the first Solidarity sponsored government, and
basically continued also by the leftist coalition when it came to power after 1993
parliamentary elections.
How destructive this democracy and market-oriented reform implementation proved
to be to the inherited shape of societal conflict, we can acertain when looking at the
new emerging social structure, and especially at the positions it offers to the main
actors of this conflict. The most impressive outcomes of these structural "shifts"
caused by the first stage of systemic transformation, seem to be those reflected
through the prism of "structural winners", i.e. those who have been able to climb to
the position of "business owners" or "self-employed", and on the other side, of
"structural losers", i.e. those who have been downgraded to the category of more or
less excluded from being permanently employed (see table 6). If we apply this way
of observing the new-imposed stratification divisions, then it appears that in the time
- span of 1988 - 1995 among those who had been most successfully moving upward
on the new - emerging stratification or social status ladder, there are first of all
representatives of business owners and self-employed in private sector before the
1989 political breakthrough, and secondly the former higher and lower managers, as
well as low skilled "non-manual" employees from the socialists economy. Much less
frequently among this category of the transformation beneficiaries are found both
principal actors of Solidarity revolution, i.e. who were in position either of
specialists not involved in the posts of authority, or the blue-collar workers.
On the other pole of this new stratificational axis we find the following "social
losers: (1) those who in 1988 were out of the labor force, i.e. mostly the
representatives of the younger generation, of whom almost a quarter have dropped to
the new-emerged category of unemployed; (2) the representatives of the socialist
working class, and among them most frequently those unskilled, of whom almost 20
percent are those who lost their jobs; (3) among those structurally excluded from
permanent employment are more frequently women, then men, and it applies
primarily to the categories of both former "self-employed", as well to the former
blue collar workers in socialist economy.
WLADYSLAW ADAMSKI
PAGE 25
Table 6. Social status "winners" and "losers" in the process of structural change in
the years 1988-1995 (Men=804, Women = 857)*
Social position in
1988
Gender
m=men;
w=women
N=100% Moved to position of Remained
at the
same
position
Dropped to the
category of
unemployed
Businessmen Self
employed
Higher managers
Lower managers
Intelligentsia
Other non-manual
employees
Skilled workers
Unskilled workers
Farmers
Peasants
Business owners
outside agriculture
Selfemployed not
hiring employees
Not employed
(in 1988)
Houswifes
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
m
w
w
 45
 17
 55
 56
 18
 49
 59
232
307
 55
 37
 70
 23
 19
 36
 52
 26
  5
 34
 17
162
155
130
   15,6
5,9
   10,9
3,6
    0,0
2,0
    6,8
1,7
    1,6
0,0
0,0
0,0
    8,7
5,3
0,0
0,0
   38,5
20,0
   17,6
0,0
3,7
0,6
0,8
 8,9
5,9
 7,3
1,8
 5,6
8,2
10,2
3,0
 6,2
7,3
 2,6
2,8
 8,7
0,0
 5,6
5,8
46,2
80,0
44,1
11,8
10,5
5,8
1,5
  71,1
76,5
  78,2
87,5
  88,9
89,8
  74,6
85,3
  80,8
74,5
  76,9
82,9
  82,6
94,7
  94,4
94,2
  11,5
0,0
  35,3
64,7
63,0
67,7
82,3
   4,4
12,8
   3,6
7,2
   5,6
0,0
   8,5
9,0
  11,5
17,9
  19,9
13,9
   0,0
0,0
   0,0
0,0
   3,8
0,0
2,9
22,8
22,8
25,5
15,4
* - computed by W. Zaborowski
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These are dramatic social divisions and they have to be perceived as being mostly of
durable character. They are additionally strengthened by either the income
differentiation or unequal career options offered by the implementation of liberal
ideology and free market-economy. Among the sources of these new structural
differentiation, that are perceived as the most drastic violation of the equality of
democratic principle of "equal opportunity" in entering to the new class of capitalist
entrepreneurs, we can identity: (1) the possession of any kind of business before
1989; (2) the managerial position performed in 1988; (3) the employment in state or
state supervised bureaucracy. Much less conducive to the position of private
business owner appeared to be the former status of "deprived of power
intelligentsia" as well as the socialist working class.
As a sign of sharply diverging interests between the contemporary workers and
intelligentsia, as former partners in Solidarity "alliance", we have also to seriously
consider the profound shifts in their social and political orientations as revealed by
the indices of participation in political parties, trade-unions and other voluntary
associations (see: table 7). When membership in political parties is concerned, the
prevailing tendency for the period of systemic transformation is almost total
withdrawal from any form of organized political participation. Except of managers
at higher positions, there is non of statistically relevant ratio of party memberships
among basic social categories of population. In 1995 it applied absolutely to the
categories of specialists with higher education and lower level managers, as well as
to selfemployed. However, in comparison to 1990 the latter category proves to be
completely disinterested in political participation and similar trend we do observe
among skilled workers.
In sharp contrast to these symptoms of social withdrawal from organized politics,
being almost equally distributed at the very low level among basic social groups,
what deserves our attention here and could be taken as the only viable form of mass
participation, is this type of spontaneous or organized social and political actions
that concentrates around the trade-unions. It is, however, attractive mostly to skilled
workers, and those members of intelligentsia who are employed either in partly
privatized, or still supervised by the government, former socialist enterprises and
state run public sector, i.e. office employees, teachers, health services etc. What is
relevant here is the fact that these categories of union members are split into nighly
politicized, each other, factions i.e. Solidarity Branch unions, and. In spite of still
strong position of so much fight each other - if not on the ground of divergent
interest, however, but rather on the ground of basic value orientations, as well as
system change preferences both unions in the course systemic transformation they
lost most of their members and supporters. The situation tends to stabilize, however,
since 1990. Nevertheless in 1995, probably as a result of the leftist Party victory in
parliamentary elections, the most influential groups of intelligentsia, and among
them mostly managers and specialists, decided to leave the ranks of Solidarity, while
at the same time there was a spectacular inflow of these categories to the Branch
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unions. This shift of members in between the main unions may be taken as a further
evidence of the dissolution of the Solidarity-led, workers-intelligentsia alliance.
What seriously aggravates this split is the fact that, while the Branch unions become
more and more strengthened by managers, the Solidarity is almost deprived of this
influential category of intelligentsia.
The above presented shifts of structural character seem to confirm the thesis of the
emergence of more classical patterns of class interests in the processes of
transformation (Machonin, 1995). In Poland this tendency is to be observed also
through the prism of value orientations which tends to be more and more closely
associated with the diverging interests. The proof of this we find when looking at the
attitudes towards strikes. Since 1990 (see: tab.7) they have been twice changing
dramatically. For the first time it happened just a year after the first quasi-democratic
election, when Solidarity firmly kept its "protective umbrella" above the first "non-
communist" government (a great majority of Solidarity members were then against
any form of destructive protests). And for the second time, it happened, when the
Solidarity people strongly supported strikes as a weapon against the "post-
communists" who returned to power after the 1993 elections.
Such a serious fluctuation in political attitudes, revealed in a short time, and its
strong dependence on the particular union membership, might be interpreted as a
sign of the survival of an old pattern of "us"-"them" conflict situation. But is it a
conflict over diverging group interests or just an expression of non-material
judgments, or moral and religious values, and some ethos's that have been
subsequently nourished by the rightist politicians? On the ground of our empirical
data we can confirm the existence of both tendencies. It means that the persistence
of highly ideologically bound distances between the two currents of Polish trade-
unions has been mostly represented by their leaders' political ambitions, while the
economic interests of those at the grass-root level members, irrespectively of their
union affiliation, tend quite elearly to converge. Drawing from our 1995 survey
results, we are in position to claim that "the primacy of materiel interests" as a
crucial prerequisite of democratic consolidation (Schopflin, 1992), has been in
Poland basically achieved. In the light of these tendencies also the earlier hypothesis,
assuming "the primacy of values over economic interests" at the pre-1989 period of
the Polish conflict evolution, and the return to "primacy of values" in the first stage
of democratic transformation (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1993), deserve to be re-evaluated and
modified.
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Table 7. Membership in political parties, trade-unions and voluntary
associations by socio-occupational categories in 1990 and 1995 (in %)
Socio-occupational
categories
Not organized
at all
Members of:
political
parties
Solidarity Branch and
other trade
unions
associations
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995
Managers at high level 0,0 5,0 16,3 5,0 24,5 35,0 22,4 10,0 51,0 50,0
Managers at low level 0,0 0,0 17,4 6,8 19,8 31,8 16,1  6,8 52,9 59,1
Free professions 0,0 0,0 30,4 7,7 0,0 0,0 21,7  0,0 47,8 92,3
Specialists  2,2 0,0 17,4 10,4 34,8 37,3  4,3 11,9 45,7 46,3
Semi-specialists 0,0 1,9 18,5 10,0 13,0 14,6 3,7 8,1 61,5 69,2
Other non-manual
employees
0,6 0,0 15,7 10,6 18,3 21,3 3,2 2,1 62,9 68,1
Skilled workers 1,3 0,0 25,4 19,4 23,7 20,0 3,1 6,1 48,9 56,1
Unskilled workers 0,0 2,3 21,6 15,9 12,5 11,4 2,3 1,1 62,8 70,5
Peasants 1,2 1,2 2,8 2,4 1,0 1,2 2,3 15,8 84,5 81,8
Self-employed outside
agriculture 5,8 0,0 3,8 4,7 0,0 3,5 5,8 13,8 88,5 80,1
Employed in private
sector:
-managers
-non-managers 1,3
0,0
0,8 3,4
4,2
6,8 0,0
4,2
8,8 0,0
0,0
5,6 92,9
91,7
79,7
Unemployed  - 0,0  - 1,5  - 1,0  - 4,9  - 92,7
Others 3,1 0,9 4,5 2,8 6,3 2,4 5,2 5,2 80,2 89,0
There is enough evidence to support the hypothesis that both the real and
endangered interests differentiation, caused by the processes of transformation
as well as accompanying them value orientations, are still contributing to the
persistence and survival of an old pattern of conflicting relations in the society.
They find their substitutory expression in the two currents of trade-union
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organizations. But is it so that this pattern of both trade unions comption, and
their affiliation either with leffist or wrighist orientation is going to dominate
the political scene, thus taking over the most of weak and dispersed political
parties? Such a threat to both the process of democratic consolidation and
further systemic transformation of economy could not be a priori excluded.
5. Interests in "transition" to market economy: research assumption and
hypotheses
In the following analysis and interpretation of our research findings for 1988, 1990
and 1995 we intend to focus on three phases of ownership transformation in Poland:
the phase of selective contesting of the old system, the phase of opening up to
market economy and the phase of selective approval of the effects of the
transformation. However, we shall be concerned less with the processes underlying
these structural changes and more with the ”actors" of change, identified in terms of
attitudes, interests and systemic preferences manifest by the individual and group
participants of these processes. In other words, our main research objective is to
recognize the interests and preferences which steer the actors of the transformation
in the afore-mentioned phases of systemic transformation. Further analysis will try
to capture the dynamics of these interests and preferences because this information
may help predict the future model of ownership relations.
Our basic research hypothesis is of this part of the paper says that the course, range
and permanence of the on-going ownership transformations in Poland and the
accompanying adaptive-innovative strategies of individual and group behavior
depend not only on the effects (past and present) of systemic interests and
preferences developed in socialist days but also on the evolution of these interests
and preferences under the pressure of new structural and systemic contingencies.
Seeking inspiration in our previous synthetic works (Adamski, 1985, 1989; Rychard,
1986, 1993; Wnuk-Lipinski, 1991), we assume that the interests and systemic
preferences (both those inherited from socialism and those which are continually
evolving in the process of transformation) which are contributing actively to the
transformation processes manifest themselves particularly forcefully in the domain
of ownership transformations. However, the rules according to which these interests
and preferences are evolving are neither homogeneous nor internally consistent. For
example the widespread unwillingness of Polish people to choose clearly between
private and state ownership is accompanied by the ever-rising attractiveness of the
group-ownership model. But on the other hand high and continually unsatisfied
aspirations to start a business of one's own go hand in hand with a reclaiming
attitude towards the state and resentiments towards capitalism. Also, sudden
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advancement to the business class or enthusiasm for the principles of market
economy by no means exclude ideological nostalgia for egalitarian society.
Does this diversity and inconsistency of rules governing the evolution of inherited
social interests and preferences during systemic transformation deserve further
scrutiny because it has high potential to block further transformation or because it
has potential to support transformational processes? We believe that both these
potentials deserve equal treatment (and in so doing we correct somewhat the ideas
inherent in Grabher and Stark's, (1997) "evolutionary theory of institutional
change"). The evolutionary theory assumes that systemic transformation takes place
not via rejection and destruction of old institutions but via their "mutation" alongside
coexistence and competition between their old and new components. The ensuing
attempt to recognize the continuity and discontinuity of "inherited forms" and new
ones is also present in our concept of interests. However, as opposed to the
institutional approach which has no great difficulty identifying acts of social change,
attempts at empirical recognition of old and new interests in the presented surveys,
and particularly attempts at tracing their dynamics, are hampered with
methodological difficulties. It applies both to the ways of defining of particular
phases of transformation as well as to describe and indicate the empirical methods of
identification of the interests involved.
Our concept of interests tries to trace the sources of economic system change in
post-socialist society to the dynamics of social structure and consciousness.
According to this approach, those who investigate systemic change should neither
predefine the target economic system (as is sometimes the case with neo-liberal
economists) nor try to evaluate its implementation against any ready-made model of
transition to market economy. This approach focuses the researcher's attention on
the differentia specifica of the social structure of state socialism, i.e., on the fact that
in this structure, private ownership was non-existent in the economy and even if
some significant relicts of such ownership survived, as they did in Poland, they were
strictly controlled by the state. If we take this peculiar feature into consideration we
will be able to detect certain forms of articulation of group interests which were
specific for the socialist system and also to pay attention to the fact that these
interests may have led to the collapse of the system from which they emerged and
even affected the development of the new system.
How we interpret the empirical data attesting to the evolution of primary interests
with respect to changes in ownership will also depend on how we decide to
distinguish the developmental phases of transformation during the entire systemic
transformation. Very significant here are the changes which take place in inherited
interests due to changes in social structure as the transformation gains impetus. Of
all three phases of transformation distinguished on the basis of available empirical
material, the legacy of the contentious phase apparently still has a key role to play.
Awareness of the interests and preferences of the socialist economic system
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developed in the eighties under the powerful influence of Solidarity's idea of "self-
governing Republic". If the concept of privatization appeared in this model at all, it
was reduced to the idea of group employee ownership or to the postulate of factory
gang participation in the utilization and management of the means of production.
These means, however, still remained under the supervision of the state bureaucracy.
The strategies of reconstruction of the Polish economy adopted in conditions of
acute economic crisis in 1989, and particularly the strategies of privatization, turned
out to be too demanding to be widely endorsed. Workers' strong aspirations to
participate in the processes of systemic transformation led to disappointment and
this in turn led to the initial re-assessment of interests which had developed at an
earlier stage. Only a few were able to advance to the class of owners or co-owners.
At the same time considerable proportions of workers, particularly the great-
industrial working class, suddenly lost their jobs and the majority of workers could
no longer be sure of employment and were aware that their income would be curbed
or at the best stagnant. Together these drastic structural eruptions resulted in
profound transformation of inherited interests and in the emergence of completely
new interests. The stream of group interests focused on gaining access to ownership
and prominent positions in the newly developing socio-occupational structure is
particularly pronounced here. This group of status-related and acquisitive interests
stands in juxtaposition to the threatened interests of social groups confronted with
the prospect of permanent social degradation. The aim of the present analysis is to
trace the evolution and dynamics of interests in these two areas, i.e., to recognize the
structure of acquisitive interests on the one hand and threatened interests on the
other hand.
6. Continuity versus discontinuity in social preferences with respect to
privatization in 1988-1995
If we view the ongoing transformations in ownership in the Polish economy as a
dramatic struggle over the systemic principles of the old and new social orders, then
neither the ultimate shape of this new order nor its acceptance by the vast majority
of Polish citizens are as yet predestined. Here is what the systemic preferences of the
Polish people, maintained so persistently from 1988 to 1995, have to say on this
matter.
The most radical bid as far as reconstruction of the post-socialist economy and the
basic public institutions is concerned, i.e., the one which endorses the neo-liberal
strategy of unlimited privatization, is accepted by the majority of Poles only with
respect to two sectors: trade and state-owned farms. At the other extreme of social
preferences we have the institutions of residential health care, i.e., the hospitals. Any
mention of privatization of hospitals in any form whatever evokes steadfast protest
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in the majority of people. The most desirable model of ownership in such
economically strategic areas as factories and banks is the mixed model. The absolute
majority of respondents would be willing to agree to only partial privatization in
these areas. At the same time, however, one in every three statistical Poles is firmly
against any form of participation of private capital in the transformation of the
ownership status of farms and banks and only one Pole in ten approves of unlimited
privatization of these sectors of the national economy.
Table 8. Changing preferences with respect to privatisation; research findings for
1988, 1990 and1995 (in percents)*
Branches of the Year Expressed preferences with
economy, institutions respect to privatisation
                                                                                     
Unlimited Limited Rejection
acceptance acceptance
_____________________________________________________________________________
1988 11.4 25.6 51.3
Large industrial plants 1990 12.5 48.9 23.3
1995 10.0 51.4 32.9
1988 10.6 24.3 44.4
Banks 1990 22.0 41.4 18.9
1995 12.4 45.8 32.0
1988   --   --   --
Trade 1990 49.4 35.7 7.3
1995 46.8 32.2 9.8
1988 11.4 25.8 51.3
Hospitals 1990 10.4 32.1 47.6
1995 10.6 37.0 48.0
1988   --   --   --
State-owned farms 1990 44.7 27.1 12.4
1995 42.4 31.9 17.9
Table 1 cont.
1988 16.4 33.2 35.9
Public transport 1990 21.4 34.4 28.2
1995 24.4 39.4 29.9
*
 "Can't say" responses omitted.
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The balance of power between the advocates of radical or moderate strategies of
change in the ownership structure on the one hand and the opponents of all
privatization is not static, however. Its dynamics (cf. Table 8) can be seen most
clearly among those who endorse limited privatization on the one hand and those
who vehemently oppose privatization on the other hand. Strong rejection is
expressed mainly with respect to privatization of industry and banking. Between
1988 and 1995 the number of adherents of limited privatization in these sectors
almost doubled whereas an opposite, albeit irregular, tendency shows up in the
diminishing forces (51% to 33%) of opponents of privatization in the basic sectors
of the economy. However, the optimism emanating from these results is less
convincing when we look at the next, five-year period, i.e., 1990-1995. Then we
shall see that the slight increment in the number of adherents of privatization is
accompanied by a radical increase in the number of respondents rejecting any
structural change whatsoever.
So, as we see, the social dynamics of systemic transformation, analyzed in the
context of approval of privatization processes, are very heterogeneous and selective.
The almost stable dominance of full approval or at least permission for privatization
of trade and state-owned farms is countered by quite an opposite tendency with
respect to changes in the ownership status of banks, and particularly large industrial
plants. These are social institutions towards which (just as towards hospitals)
acceptance of uncurbed penetration of private ownership has invariably been at the
lowest possible level over the entire seven-year period of transformation. At the
same time a spectacular increase in acceptance of partial privatization of these
institutions was found between 1988 and 1990.
Two tendencies are particularly noteworthy in this area of preference. First, the drop
in acceptance of radical changes in 1990-1995 involved only those sectors which
play a decisive role in the process of systemic transformation. Second, the
decreasing endorsement of privatization is accompanied by a stronger increment in
the level of disapproval of all attempts at ownership reconstruction in this area. The
joint outcome of these two tendencies is manifested in the fact that the more
moderate orientation, i.e., the endorsement of the speeding up of limited
privatization, dominates in the structure of preferences whereas only a minority of
respondents approve of radical solutions. In other words, the majority of Poles, who
are in the process of correcting their ideas concerning socialism and capitalism,
formed prior to the 1989 political breakthrough, are apparently leaning towards the
golden middle situated between models of privatization based on fully liberal
principles on the one hand and defence of the status quo of post-socialist state
ownership on the other hand. The fact that almost three times more respondents
oppose any form of privatization in Polish industry and banking than endorse a fully
liberal solution in this area reinforces the significance of the central orientation in
which lies the greatest hope for further ownership changes in the Polish economy.
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Table 9. The correlates of preferences with respect to privatisation of large
industrial plants and banks in 1995 (Pearson's r, N=2000)
Socio-demographic descriptors, material status and Full approval (1)
political orientation of respondent Partial approval (2)
Rejection (3)           
large plants      banks
Date of birth -.115 -.112
Education (1=incomplete primary 8=higher) -.194     -.167
Sex (0=F, 1=M) -.123     -.130
Position (0=non-managerial, 1=managerial) -.085     -.071
Assessment of household material status (1=very good, 5=very bad)  .093       .118
Assessment of household material status in last 5-6 years
(1=definitely deteriorated, 5=definitely improved) -.062    -.036
Does R. run his own business (0=no, 1=yes)   -.083    -.082
Changes in the country mean more
opportunities (1), more threats (2) for R  .137     .139
Participation in strikes (0=no, 1=yes)  .066     .064
Participation in street demonstrations (0-no, 1=yes) -.117 -.019
Are differences in income in Poland too large (1), too small (3)  .075  .046
For people like R. life in Poland is better
today (1), will be better in five years (2)  .154     .158
Table 2 cont.
Should the government withdraw some of its
command over the economy (1=defin.yes, 4=defin.no)  .163  -.185
Political self-definition (1=defin, leftist, 4=defin. rightist)  .207  .169
Is Polish independence at risk (1=yes, 4=no)    .190    .133
Support for integration with NATO (1=defin.yes,  5=defin.no)  .262    .190
Support for integration with EU (1=defin.yes, 5=defin.no)  .246    .226
Support for further influx of German capital (1=defin.yes, 5=defin.no)  .211    .197
The state should curtail the income of the
highest income groups (1=defin.yes, 4=defin.no) -.062  -.042
The state should insure highly diversified wages depending
on qualifications and output  .198    .152
The state should support employee self-government
in enterprise management  .184    .170
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Also, it is worth keeping in mind that with the passage of time ownership
transformations according to the model of partial privatization are gaining
acceptance with respect to public services, including hospital care, as well.
Will these dynamic tendencies in social preferences with respect to the new,
emerging ownership structure in the Polish national economy be stable or should we
expect a change of orientation, i.e., a significant increase in approval of unlimited
privatization? Closer insight into the correlation's between the analyzed ownership
preferences for 1995 suggests rather unequivocally that these preferences are
evolving. This evolution seems to be going in the direction of gradual increase in
acceptance of the ongoing changes in the structure of ownership. A look at the
correlational analysis (Table 9) will help us indicate the sources of possible
reorientation of this presently rather unfavorable balance of power between the
adherents and the opponents of privatization. The most certain source of potential
change, albeit one whose effects will only be noticeable in more long-term
perspective, is the fact that the enthusiasts of the development of private ownership,
uncurbed by administrative limitations, are usually young people with better than
average education. The more permanent this interaction and the stronger the current
rush to college in the young generation, the more significant its effects will be.
The second source of potential increase of orientations conducive in one way or
another to the development of privatization lies in the fact that privatization is
supported by such structural changes as sudden social upward mobility, associated
with shifting to the business or managerial class, and with positive ratings of
changes in the material status of the respondent and his/her household. We are
referring here both to ratings of the current state of things and ratings of the near past
and the anticipated nearest future. We know that the educational boom has helped to
promote acceptance of private ownership. Similarly, the effectiveness of the
remaining structural factors should increase in proportion to the increase in the
national income, assuming that it will be reasonably justly distributed. Such policy
can count on significant (though not dramatic) acceptance from the advocates of
privatisation.
The prospect of positive reorientation of the social acceptance of further
restructuring of the Polish economy according to the rules of private ownership is
finally receiving clear support in the form of accompanying political views. Those
who approve of privatization most strongly also usually approve of Polish
integration with NATO and the European Union. Those respondents are also the
most determined advocates of such state policies which encourage further
investment of German capital in Poland. And although this may seem shocking and
paradoxical, it is not the Poles who define themselves as right-wingers but those
who identify with the left side of the political scene who act as the ideological
promotors of radical privatisation. This seeming paradox will resolve itself,
however, when we see that the leftist orientation we are dealing with here is rather
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specific: it correlates not only with such biographical markers as a left-wing
background (measured in terms of membership of both the respondent and the
respondent's father in the Polish communist party) or strong endorsement of the
policy of support for employee self-governments but also with young age, above-
average education and above-average participation in the power structure, measured
in terms of holding a managerial position.
7. The evolution of acquisitive and threatened interests in the context of
approval vs. disapproval of privatisation
In accordance with the adopted methodology, we shall identify the potential actors
and promotors of the transformation of the ownership structure by referring to the
interactions between the systemic attitudes and preferences of our respondents on
the one hand and the structural context of the situation of the carriers of these
attitudes and preferences (which changes as the transformation proceeds) on the
other hand. From 1988 on, two principles of social grouping have invariably proven
to be the most sensitive detectors of the dynamics of preferences with respect to
privatisation. First we have the divisions between and within the basic socio-
economic categories; here the criterion of variance according to differences in
interests is closeness to vs. "distance" from the power structure, i.e., whether or not
the respondents within one common socio-occupational category hold managerial
positions or have no access to such positions. Second we have divisions within the
different socio-occupational categories, manifested in terms of membership in one
or other of two competing trade unions, i.e., Solidarity and Branch unions. In this
case the decisive differential factor is the difference in values and ideological
orientation which causes these values and orientations to generate different attitudes
toward changes in the ownership structure, often in opposition to, or discord with,
the alleged interests of the people controlled by these values.
From 1990 on, and in 1995 in particular, a third division showed up. Differences in
the support or rejection of privatization began to show up more and more clearly,
depending on how respondents assessed the changes in their families and their
material situation. Despite outward similarities, the social groups distinguished this
way do not coincide with the so-called objective division into "winners" and "losers"
in the process of transformation. Although each of these methods of social grouping
highlights a different pattern of interests and values, enmeshed in ongoing changes
in the structure of privatization, they may be analyzed together as an expression of
social dynamics and the mutual friction of "acquisitive" and "threatened" interests.
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Table 10. Changes in preferences with respect to privatization of industry and
socio-occupational position in 1988, 1990 and 1995 (percents)
Socio-occupational Year N Unlimited Limited Against
position privatization privatization privatization
Specialists and 1988 160 8.8 41.3 43.8
managers 1990 143 18.9 58.7 19.6
1995 85 23.5 58.8 15.3
Remaining 1988 328 11.5 32.9 48.2
white-collar 1990 324 14.5 54.3 20.4
1995 316 11.1 66.8 18.0
Blue/white- 1988 142 13.4 28.9 38.0
collar 1990 129 10.1 49.6 26.4
1995 119 5.9 47.9 37.0
Skilled 1988 517 15.5 36.4 40.0
workers 1990 424 13.2 52.8 25.2
1995 345 8.1 52.2 36.2
Skilled 1988 175 11.4 31.4 42.3
workers 1990 199 11.1 50.8 22.1
1995 146 6.2 42.5 43.8
Farmers 1988 225 11.0 27.5 34.1
1990 341 7.0 35.8 26.7
1995 165 5.5 43.6 43.0
Owners other 1988 69 27.5 42.0 20.3
than farmers 1990 58 24.1 48.0 20.7
1995 142 16.9 56.3 24.6
Unemployed 1988 -- -- -- --
1990 87 14.9 47.1 24.1
1995 205 8.8 48.8 37.6
The two distinctions traditionally made in the sociology of social structure, i.e.,
workers/intelligentsia and owners-entrepreneurs/farmers is still very useful when we
wish to analyze preferences with respect to privatization (cf. Table 10). However,
between 1988 and 1995 the evolution of these preferences in the two basic
categories proceeds according to different patterns. What we see is a truly dramatic
widening of the gap between the interests of the main heroes of the Solidarity
struggle, i.e., skilled workers and the "proletarianised intelligentsia". With their
drastically diminishing support for unlimited privatization, workers are now situated
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next to the most reactionary category, i.e., the peasants, and the unemployed whereas
the educated intelligentsia, though initially unfavourably disposed toward
privatisation, is now one of the most radical supporters of change in ownership
structure. In this context it is truly surprising that, despite popular expectations to the
contrary, entrepreneurs in non-agricultural sectors of production and services, i.e.,
those who are supposed to provide the basic structure on which the "new middle
class" is to develop, clearly manifest not only systematically decreasing support for
privatization but even soaring disapproval.
Table 11. Changes in preferences with respect to privatization of the
industrial sector depending on socio-occupational position
and function in 1988-1995 (percents)
Socio- Function
occupational
position Unlimited Limited Against
privatization privatization privatization
1988 1990 1995 1988 1990 1995 1988 1990 1995
Specialist NMx 11,0 22,0 20,0 48,0 56,0 60,0 34,0 18,0 16,0
M   4,0 12,5 29,5 28,0 66,0 56,0 64,0 21,5 15,0
Technician NM   9,0 16,0 10,5 37,0 62,0 67,0 46,0 15,0 18,0
M   8,0 15,5 14,5 32,5 53,0 65,0 52,0 24,0 19,0
Office NM 16,0 14,5   9,0 27,0 55,5 42,0 16,0
worker M 12,5   0,0 62,5 33,0 25,0 33,0
White/blue NM 13,5 13,0 5,0 28,0 48,0 48,5 37,5 25,5 38,0
collar M 13,5   4,0 8,0 30,0 42,0 46,5 40,5 34,5 33,5
Skilled NM 14,5 13,0 8,0 37,0 52,5 52,5 40,0 26,0 36,5
workers M 25,0 19,0 13,0 27,0 44,0 52,0 39,0 22,0 35,0
x
 NM - nonmanagerial M - managerial
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This ever-deepening rift between the interests of the workers and the intelligentsia,
which showed up so convincingly in the dynamics of preferences with respect to the
privatization of industry, gains in clarity when we look at it in the context of
differences in these two social categories with respect to their access to managerial
positions (cf. Table 11). In 1988 workers as a whole, and especially those workers
who had some power, i.e., foremen and gangsmen, endorsed the idea of unlimited
privatization in the industrial sector many times more frequently than specialists
with managerial positions and they also opposed the idea much less whereas in
1990-1995 both groups reversed their orientations towards privatisation. By 1995 it
was mainly managers with higher education who acted as promotors of unlimited
restructuring of the ownership system whereas as far as foremen and gangsman as
well as office-workers and white/blue-collar workers are concerned, liberal
preference previously so openly voiced, now began to erode systematically and
approach the average level for blue-collar workers in general and white collar
workers with secondary education.
These contradictory evolutionary tendencies in the preferences of blue-collar
workers and related groups on the one hand and the intelligentsia and managers on
the other hand seem to express changes in the perception of privatization depending
on whether the interests of one and other group are believed to be supported or
threatened. In 1988, i.e., at the beginning of the political breakthrough, two-thirds of
the educated managers were opposed to any form of privatization (probably due to
their fear of losing their high positions and the risk of social degradation) whereas
one qualified workman in seven and one foreman or gangsman in four in this
category approved of unlimited privatization of socialist industry (probably because
the hope of advancement via participation in the administration of state ownership
and the ensuing development of acquisitive interests).
It seems that this switch of direction in the evolution of preferences with respect to
privatization between workmen and managers in 1990, and especially in 1995,
depends directly on how one and other group assessed the ongoing changes in
ownership structure: as the expression of unsatisfied hopes of a better position in the
newly developing social structure or as an expression of the receding threat of social
degradation.
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Table 12. Preferences with respect to privatisation of large factories as
related to socio-occupational position and perceived change
in material situation, own and household, over last 5-6 years
in 1995 (percents)
Socio-
occupational
position
Perceived
change in
household
situation in 5-6
years
N Complete Limited Against Cramer's
coefficient
- 45 11.0 66.5 20.0
Enterpresents = 34 23.5 47.0 29.5 .136
+ 61  18.0 52.5 26.0
- 27 22.0 40.6 33.5
Managers and = 18 22.0 78.0 -- .289
Specialists + 39 25.5 64.0 10.5
- 150 8.0 64.5 22.5
Remaining = 68 14.5 64.5 14.5 .113
White-collared + 90 14.5 70.0 13.5
- 62 3.0 43.5 42.0
Blue/white = 32 12.5 50.0 34.5 .162
collared + 23 4.5 52.0 30.5
- 188 10.5 45.5 40.0
Qualified = 89 3.5 55.0 37.0 .132
workmen + 65 6.0 66.0 26.0
Table 5 cont.
- 86 6.0 43.0 46.5
Unqualified = 36 5.5 44.5 47.0 .228
workmen + 22 4.5 41.0 27.0
- 105 6.5 45.0 43.0
Farmers = 43 2.3 46.0 42.5 .109
+ 15 6.5 26.5 53.0
- 136 8.5 45.0 40.5
Unemployed = 30 6.5 60.0 30.0 .101
+ 37 11.0 57.0 29.5
- deterioration   /   = no change   /   + improvement
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We find the answer to this question in the relationships between preferences with
respect to privatization on the one hand and the respondent's assessment of his own
material situation and that of his household (cf. Table 12). Opposition against
privatization is most successfully softened when current material conditions of life
are perceived as better than 5-6 years earlier. This pattern is found not only for
specialists, managers and qualified workmen but also for the remaining groups of
hired workers including those who were unemployed in 1995. On the other hand this
relationship is reversed for entrepreneurs and particularly for farmers. The
established pattern apparently has different determinants in each particular case. The
tendency to disapprove of any form of privatization whatsoever is strongest in
farmers, probably because the first to be hit by the reductions in employment which
accompany privatization were the peasants-cum-workmen, who live in the villages.
On the other hand, private entrepreneurs in the non-agricultural sector may view
privatized enterprises as rivals with whom it will not be so easy to compete as it was
in the previous "deficit economy".
Other than the differences in preferences with respect to privatization, which showed
up when the respondents were grouped according to the degree of realization of
prospective status interests or current existential interests, the differences in
preference depending on trade-union affiliation indicate that endorsement of one or
other privatization strategy is determined not only by interests but also by
systemically contradictory value systems, expressed in distinct ideological and
political predilections and preferences.
In all the basic socio-economic groups, and particularly among blue-collar workers,
members of "Solidarity" - with their greater support and weaker rejection of
privatization - differed significantly from the members of Branch unions (the
federation of trade unions of the different branches of industry). Later fluctuations in
the declared acceptance of privatization in one and other group are clearly related to
the changed political orientation of the ruling coalition. In 1990 "Solidarity"
members (except specialists and managers) show a distinct increase in support for
the privatization program whereas changes in the preferences of Branch unions,
mainly unskilled workers, go in the opposite direction. Differences between
members of the two trade unions adhere to an analogous pattern in 1995. This time,
once again (primarily the blue-collar workers), with the consistent exception of the
educated, pro-reform intelligentsia, Solidarity members drastically withdrew their
support for privatization controlled by the leffist governing then coalition whereas
the Branch unionists manifested increased support and much weaker disapproval
(compared with their colleagues from Solidarity) of unlimited privatization.
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8. The attractiveness of patterns of private and state ownership in the
economy: differences and changes in preferences in 1990-1995
Although privatization of post-socialist property is the key theme of social and
political dispute and controversy, it by no means exhausts the sociological approach
to the issue of transformation in the structure of ownership in the economy. Social
preferences with respect to currently functioning patterns of economy based on the
rules of private, group or state ownership, are equally important. The research
findings for 1990 and 1995 presented in Tables 7 and 8 provide us with the first
opportunity to get a glimpse of the differences and dynamics of these preferences in
basic employee categories.
These data were obtained by asking respondents the following question: "If it were
entirely up to you, where would you prefer to work: (a) in a private firm, (b) in a
state-owned firm, (c) in a firm of your own?
The overall outcome of this "voting session" (cf. Table 13) revealed two dominant
preferences: the first choice is the private enterprise, where the respondent himself is
the owner, the second choice (just as frequent) is the state as the preferred owner of
the firm in which the respondent works as a hired worker. Least popular is the third
option, i.e., work for a private employer, at home or abroad. This pattern of desirable
professional career is clearly the least attractive of all. If we assume that these
preferences are based not on fantasies but on real experience with the pros and cons
of rival systems of ownership, then the differences and developmental trends in
these preferences ought to be carefully observed by the transformation strategists.
One of the key problems here is the very low and more or less decreasing
attractiveness of hired work in a private firm in 1990-1995. Specialists with higher
education, including managers in particular but also foremen and gangsmen,
normally classified as qualified workmen, are the only positive exception to this
pattern. In this context we are struck by the increased attractiveness of work in the
public sector. In the five year period we are analyzing here, this increase can be
observed in every social category except managers with higher education. In the
group of specialists with secondary education, blue/white-collar workers and
unqualified workmen this increase is a real leap. However, this tendency in the
evolution of employee preferences, so unfavourable for the future of the private
sector, is balanced by the relatively stable level of aspirations concerning having a
business of one's own.
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Table 13. Systemic preferences concerning desired place of work as related to
respondent's socio-occupational position and managerial function in
1995 (percents)
Socio- Function If it were entirely up to you where would
occupational you prefer to work?
position
private firm state firm my own firm abroad
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995
Specialist NM 6.0 10.0 24.0 26.0 51.0 38.0 6.0 2.0
M 11.0  20.5 23.5 17.5 51.0 41.0 5.5 6.0
Remaining  NM  9.5 7.5 24.0 42.5 36.5 35.0 10.5  4.0
office   M  8.5 8.0 31.0 30.5 40.0 43.5 8.5 9.5
Blue/white NM 10.0 7.5 20.5 39.0 28.5 42.0 11.0 4.0
collar M  4.0 8.5 40.0 41.5 44.0 41.5 4.0 0.0
Qualified  NM 14.5 7.5 29.0 42.0 25.0 32.0 18.0 17.0
workmen     M  9.5  17.5 32.5 35.0 29.0 30.5 13.0 8.5
Unqualified NM 15.5 7.0 40.0 60.0 38.0 18.0 9.5 9.0
workmen
NM - nonmanagerial    M - managerial
The percents do not add up to 100 because "other" and "don't know" responses have been omitted.
With the exception of unqualified workmen and specialists (who are gradually
losing interest in this type of career, probably for different reasons), the remaining
socio-occupational groups dream of working "in their own business" and this dream
is invariably high and tending to intensify. A clear sign of this is the fact that thirty
to forty odd percent of Poles in the work force persistently maintain these ambitious
aspirations.
Can these strong tendencies (a) to accept private ownership (but mainly in the form
of a business of one's own) and at the same time (b) to reject hired employment
under a "private employer" and strongly endorse the state as employer, be
interpreted in terms of both acquisitive interests (albeit ones which have still not
been satisfied) and group interests for which the previous privatization processes
pose a real threat, not only to current existential interests but also to prospective
status-related interests? I think this may be possible. If so, then the distinction made
above probably results not only from such structural sources as: higher education
and, in particular, managerial position. Cultural-ideological variables also seem to
be intervening here. The differences in preferences depending on trade-union
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affiliation show that this is actually the case. Attractiveness of one or other system of
ownership still depends significantly on trade-union affiliation: to Solidarity or
Branch unions or neither. The state owner is much more attractive for members of
Branch unions than members of Solidarity, especially if the respondent is a specialist
with higher education but also if he belongs to the class of remaining white-collar
workers or unqualified workmen. In all categories of respondents except blue/white-
collar workers, affiliation with Branch unions, and probably organizational ties with
the present social-democratic party as well, has left its mark in the form of much
weaker desire to have a business of one's own than in respondents affiliated with
Solidarity or not affiliated with any trade union at all.
Table 14. Systemic preferences with respect to present place of work depending
on whether or not it is privatized and whether or not Respondent holds
a managerial position there, 1995 (percents)
Place of work Position N
Preferred type of ownership
state employee
(co-op.)
private
Other than Manag. 84 47.6 42.9 9.5
private sector Nonmanag. 438 57.8 38.1 4.1
Private Manag. 26  7.7 46.2 46.2
sector Nonmanag. 196 27.0 45.4 27.6
The differences in systemic preferences are even more pronounced when we relate
them directly to the current and desired status of the enterprise in which the
respondent is employed and when we add the option of free choice of the ownership
structure of the enterprise to the list of systemic options. Material for this analysis
may be gleaned from the responses to the following question: "What do you think,
what form of ownership would be best in your firm?" Respondents could choose
from a list of seven options. We have selected three basic options for further
analysis: state (treasury) ownership, employee (co-operative) ownership and private
ownership.
The systemic preferences with respect to the firm in which the respondent works (cf.
Table 14) seem to confirm the popular sociological cliché that "what you think
depends on where you sit". However, the empirical findings suggest that this
principle is not symmetrical: it is fully supported for respondents employed in the
unprivatised sector whereas it refers much less strongly and more inconsistently to
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those employed in the private sector. The former category of respondents (the rank-
and file rather than the managers) are largely in favor of the state ownership model
whereas respondents from the other side of the barricade embrace the model of
private ownership of enterprises. This option is indicated by one in every two
managers working in such enterprises and one in four rank-and-file employees. Both
types of employees, however, i.e., "privatized" and "state-owned", share the view
that the best form of ownership for their enterprise is employee ownership; this
option was selected by almost equal numbers of representatives of both categories. It
is noteworthy that this bias towards employee ownership, i.e., group ownership, is
slightly stronger among those working in the private sector (both managers and
rank-and-file workers) than among those employed in the public sector.
The differences in preferences presented above suggest that both "threatened"
employee interests, i.e., those which will block any potential change in form of
ownership, and acquisitive interests, i.e., those which are open to structural change,
can be found in both sectors, public and private, albeit in different degrees. In other
words, not only the negligible attractiveness of the private enterprise model among
employees of the public sector but also weak approval of this model among
employees in managerial positions working in private firms is a serious problem:
one in four managers employed in the private sector say that a state-owned
enterprise is still their most desirable place of work.
Trade-union affiliations throw additional light on the stability and prospects of
change in the pattern of dominant interests and preferences with respect to potential
paths and opportunities for further restructuring of the economy. Traditionally,
Branch unions are the bastion of state ownership and opposition towards private
ownership. However, this is true mainly of those unionists who are specialists with
higher education or white collar workers. As far as blue-collar workers are
concerned, both trade unions locate their interests in the model of employee
ownership and definitely reject the private ownership. Despite their inherited mutual
aversion, both unions (and particularly their most numerous segment, i.e., blue-
collar workers), articulate the same shared sense of threat concerning the prospect of
privatization. The largest number of advocates of further privatization and the fewest
opponents of such change are to be found among those workers who do not belong
to any trade union.
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Conclusion
The presented analyses show that the Poles attitudes and preferences with respect to
systemic transformation in the national economy differ greatly and are evolving with
the progression of systemic transformation. However, the direction in which this
evolution is going is by no means clear: true, the dominant theme is acceptance and
support of the ongoing changes in ownership structure but we are also observing
significant, persistent and increasing symptoms of rejection or intensely emotionally
charged disapproval. The main target of these contradictory opinions are the
programs of restructuring of the key branches of state-owned industry and banking,
according to the capital privatization principle. Equally discrepant are the
preferences with respect to most desirable forms of ownership, aspirations to
become a businessman, and the status of the enterprise in which respondents would
be most willing to work as hired employees.
The nature of these differences in attitude and preference shows that they clearly
depend on the respondent's economic situation (household income and its
assessment) and on the respondent's position in the process of transformation, both
of which differ depending on the phase of transformation. Interpretation of these
relationships in terms of group interests entitles us to distinguish two types of
interests: first the interests of those social groups which perceive the changes in
ownership structure mainly in terms of the risks which these changes pose for
previously achieved standards of living and social positions and second the interests
of those groups which have successfully made the most of the opportunities and
possibilities which have been spread before them by the transition to market
economy, i.e., clear-cut or even spectacular improvement of income and social
position.
Assuming that the situation where "structural and subjective gains clearly outweigh
structural and subjective losses" is the measure of success in the ongoing post-
socialist transformation, we may say, in light of our findings, that we still have a
long way to go before we achieve this measure of success. But despite and over and
above the fact that in the meantime rejection of privatization is weakening only in
the group of white-collar workers whereas it is growing in the basic social classes,
we have reason to predict that the present level of social consciousness will not be
able to hold back the process of ownership transformation. On the other hand,
pressure from those social groups which perceive themselves most acutely as
"structural losers" but at the same time are managing to realize their interests
successfully, may introduce more or less significant modifications to the strategy of
privatization and restructuring of the economy.
The crucial argument in favour of this prognosis is that the between-group and meta-
group social bonds which were so characteristic in the eighties no longer exist. One
of the spectacular manifestations of this truth is the disintegration of the common
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interests of the workers and the intelligentsia and the previous readiness of these two
groups to co-operate as partners. New social divisions brought about by the
transformation processes, and mainly by opening the gates wide open to economy
based on private ownership, are leading to the crystallization of new interests and
new social bonds. These are now forming within classes and large social-
occupational groups rather than over and above these classes and groups.
Therefore, even though workmen are much less likely than entrepreneurs to view
their material situation as improved, they are equally vehemently opposed to
privatization of large state-owned firms, albeit probably for different reasons.
Holding a managerial position has a similarly disintegrating effect (and a much
stronger one than before) on intra-class/group cohesion of interests and preferences
with respect to transformation of the ownership structure. This probably explains
why specialists and managers so numerously switched fields to become radical
enthusiasts of privatization in 1990-1995.
Blue-collar workers in large industrial plants are one of the basic social groups
manifesting deep splitting and ambivalence when asked to choose between state-
ownership and one or other model of privatization. This group, which once made up
almost one half of the entire work force, is now considerably reduced in size and
scattered between enterprises differing in ownership status but at the same time it is
supremely organized into trade unions. Blue-collar workers today are the only
influential social class which has not yet come to terms with the status which the
newly-emerging economic system has to offer. What distinguishes this class from
the remaining ones is: (a) strong and still rising aspirations to "start a business of
their own" along with even stronger and even more rapidly increasing rejection of
the ongoing privatization of state owned firms; (b) aversion towards hired work in
private firms and consistent clinging to the public employer whose only acceptable
alternative is the model of employee-owned enterprise or some other form of
ownership with significant employee participation.
Such ambivalent aspirations can be expected to stimulate enough social and political
problems for at least several more governing coalitions.
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